Lula is now free. So what?
Lula’s release restores legality and the principle of the rule of law, after a political imprisonment with the connivance of a Sergio Moro who, in the lure of ambition, ended up deceived by Bolsonarism. But what now? It is clear that a direct election for the holder of a political office with the dimension of the President of the Republic, particularly in presidentialist regimes, always carries an aura of personality cult. In Brazil, the situation goes beyond the charismatic dimension, settling on a plane of obvious political messianism that is pernicious for democracy. From Collor de Melo to Bolsonaro, from Lula to Dilma, we see a world of ideological trenches, of wanderings between anti-systemic leaders dubbed “myth”, and the father/mother figure of the “nation”, but never leaving populism.
So, although Lula’s release may lead the PT to the temptation of re-candidating the former President, such a decision would, in my view, be a mistake. The way the last electoral campaign took place with fake news, character attacks, and cultural combat, around a solid and institutional figure like Fernando Haddad, lets us foresee a difficult electoral campaign for Lula, especially since the matter of discrediting Haddad was, precisely, the direct association with the previous one. It is true that Lula still enjoys immense political capital, appearing in a broad social spectrum as the “father of the nation”, in the Getulian populist style, albeit left-wing. However, a good part of the electorate won by Bolsonaro was within an “anti-Petista” wave represented in Lula.
Thus, the future of Brazilian politics may not pass through the PT, but rather through a renewed centre-left movement, albeit with the support of that one. In other words, what Brazil seems to need is a “Portuguese-style” alternative, capable of playing to the centre while keeping one hand on the left. This, bearing in mind that the centre-right has evaporated into the global “new right”, manifested in an economic-liberal and moral-conservative nationalism. No one would be better qualified to lead this process than Fernando Haddad, had he not decapitalised his political image in the previous elections. The possibility advanced by the Brazilian press that Haddad could emerge as number two for a possible Lula candidacy in 2022, makes it very clear that Haddad is excessively dependent on Lula and the PT. Guilherme Boulos and Ciro Gomes could emerge as alternatives, although they lack the charisma needed to capitalise on a broad electoral spectrum.
It is therefore predictable that Brazil will not be able to free itself from the PT-New Right bipolarisation, and it should not be overlooked that, within the messianic populism inscribed in the country’s social and political culture, there is a proto-religious aspiration to see a Manichean combat between Lula and Bolsonaro.